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In pervasive computing systems, a higher number of in-
teractions will be mediated by computers, amplifying the
menace to privacy. Privacy protection in pervasive envi-
ronments is still a big issue, despite the growing number of
works on this subject as evidenced by this survey. In this
paper, we propose a taxonomy for privacy invasion attacks,
classify existing privacy enhancing technologies according
to the protection provided for those attacks, and introduce a
service-oriented privacy-enhanced architecture for perva-
sive computing.
1 Introduction
Each culture deals with privacy in a different way. Those
differences may appear to be subtle when comparing civi-
lizations with similar cultures, but they become bigger when
we take into account more isolated cultures that were less
influenced by the western perspective on privacy. In some
tribes, for instance, the concept of a private space does not
exist and it is common to find whole families living in the
same house without walls. However, while one can ques-
tion how much privacy is necessary on a society (or even if
it is needed at all), it is clear that citizens have the right of a
private space and this right must be protected, so that they
can choose to reveal personal data instead of being forced
to disclose it.
Controversy exists on the meaning of privacy, as this
word is used in different scenarios and contexts whenever
people want to justify the confidentiality of an informa-
tion. In this paper we use a pragmatic definition: privacy
is control over information disclosure. As a consequence, a
privacy-aware system allows for conscious disclosure deci-
sions. A privacy invasion occurs when information regard-
ing an entity is disclosed without its explicit consent.
Even this simplified definition presents many challenges,
since it is yet unclear which is the best way to control infor-
mation disclosure, how to identify and manage it, and when
an information is sensitive. At times, a seemingly innocent
transaction may be highly invasive when correlated with
other data. Future pervasive environments have the poten-
tial of collecting and correlating a greater quantity of data,
thus increasing the menace to privacy posed by computer
systems. This risk is closely related to the system archi-
tecture, as it defines how data flows from users to applica-
tions. In our vision, pervasive computing systems and appli-
cations will follow the service-oriented architecture (SOA)
paradigm as it is well suited to handle the heterogeneity,
dynamism and mobility inherent to those environments.
A generic pervasive service-oriented application can be
described as consisting of a mobile client using some kind
of contextual information to access a service. Client and
service provider roles are not fixed, and contextual infor-
mation is used to customize the service to the user’s needs.
Every other entity not directly related to the service access
is considered as a third party. According to our definition of
privacy, client and service providers can be victims of pri-
vacy invasions performed by each other, or by a non-related
third party. In this scenario, information regarding a ser-
vice access, including the service existence, should only be
available to parties involved with the transaction. In addi-
tion, they should disclose only the minimal required infor-
mation to complete a given task. Whenever these conditions
do not hold, privacy invasions may happen according to the
strategies described on Table 1. Categorization of privacy
protection techniques according to the attacks they intend
to avoid can help system designers to understand their goals
and their common properties.
2 Privacy Protection Technologies
We classify privacy technologies according to the protec-
tion they provide against the attacks we identified, namely:
protecting the service access content, protecting the exis-
tence of a service access, protecting information disclosure
and protecting information usage.
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Attacker Privacy Invasion Strategy
Third Party Learn about the occurrence of a service access
Learn about the contents of a service access
Client Obtain more information than required for the service access
Use obtained information for a different purpose
Service Provider Obtain more information than required for the service access
Use obtained information for a different purpose
Table 1. Privacy invasion strategies
Protecting the content of a service access This problem
is the same as avoiding leakage of data on a legitimate com-
munication channel [19]. This is usually obtained by us-
ing cryptographic techniques such as public-key encryption
or secure communication protocols. Although some issues
still exist (key management notably being one of them),
available cryptosystems provide an acceptable protection
against this type of privacy invasion strategy.
Protecting the existence of a service access Covert chan-
nels [19] can be used to reveal information about the oc-
currence of a service access. Those channels can either be
avoided or have their quality degraded to impede practical
information leakage. Design guidelines [18, 20] and pat-
terns [8] can help software designers to avoid covert chan-
nel creation at design time, but are not sufficient to eradicate
covert channels since some of them are unavoidable. For in-
stance, IP network packets must have a source address and
a destination address to allow for packet routing. This in-
formation, however, was never meant to be used to reveal
information about the user’s activity. Many systems tried to
reduce the bandwidth of this channel by mixing messages
during routing [7, 26, 10] or introducing noise by generat-
ing fake packets to hide real communication [12, 28].
Protecting information disclosure Clients and service
providers must disclose only data that is strictly neces-
sary during a service access. Decisions about which data
has to be disclosed, for what purposes and how it should
be disclosed can be agreed upon beforehand, through the
use of labeling protocols such as P3P [25] and PawS [21].
Personal and contextual data must also be modified to re-
veal only data required by the transaction and nothing else.
Three techniques can be used to adjust personal data resolu-
tion: modification, multiplication and generalization. Mod-
ification substitutes the requested information for a differ-
ent information, multiplication replaces a requested infor-
mation with a set of data where the requested information is
contained and generalization substitutes the requested infor-
mation with another less specific data that could correspond
to different values of the requested information. Many tech-
niques were developed to change the resolution of loca-
tion data, modifying [13, 2], generalizing [1] or multiply-
ing them [11, 16]. Images are also sensitive data, and there
are techniques that enables modification [9] and generaliza-
tion [15, 3, 29, 22] of specific kinds of images (such as the
face of a person recorded by a webcam). Finally, identity
information can also be generalized to avoid connections
between data and individuals [6, 27, 4].
Protecting information usage This is one of the biggest
challenges to privacy in pervasive computing. Even though
labeling protocols such as P3P and PawS can be used to
specify usage restrictions, they can do little to enforce
those constraints. Privacy Rights Management (PRM) [17]
was proposed as an approach inspired by Digital Rights
Management (DRM) to protect personal data usage.
The main shortcoming of those technologies is that they
are totally disconnected. The privacy benefits provided by
one solution disappear when another technology is used
concurrently. For instance, location-privacy strategies can
reveal the source of a message even if communication
anonymization protocols are in place. Most of the time it
is impossible to combine two techniques due to conflicting
requirements. Software architectures for privacy are neces-
sary to provide a common framework for privacy technolo-
gies, such that they can be combined to effectively protect
personal data at all system levels. However, it is only re-
cently that some architectures were proposed to control use
of personal data [23], access and storage [14] and identity
[5].
3 Towards a Pervasive Privacy Architecture
We envision future pervasive computing environments as
open systems, where users will be able to spontaneously
collaborate by creating ad-hoc networks and discovering
and composing services dynamically. In such environments
with heterogeneous devices and multiple administrative do-
mains, usage control is hard to obtain and might be even
unfeasible. We thus propose an architecture that provides
Proceedings of the Working IEEE/IFIP
Conference on Software Architecture (WICSA'07)
0-7695-2744-2/07 $20.00  © 2007
mechanisms to control disclosure of personal information
and enable users to reveal only the information strictly nec-
essary to perform a service access. This can reduce the ef-
fects of usage violations of personal data executed by mali-
cious third parties.
The use of SOAs in environments as the one described
above creates new threats to privacy. Service information
such access, discovery and published descriptions are sensi-
tive and must be protected, since they can provide informa-
tion about an user’s activity to an external observer. More-
over, contextual information may be used in service pub-
lishing and location to improve service discovery perfor-
mance [24] increasing the sensitiveness of service informa-
tion. To protect it, it is necessary to enforce access control
rules not only during service access, but also over service
publishing, discovery and composition.
Contextual data disclosure must also be controlled, since
it is rich and may reveal personal information. Clients and
service providers must agree on the resolution required for
the context data, as well as other details such as periodicity.
Before disclosure, context data resolution must be automat-
ically adjusted to the level previously negotiated to avoid
transmission of sensitive data irrelevant for the transaction.
Access to this data must also be controlled through a scal-
able mechanism capable of managing a high number of ob-
jects, enforceable whenever data is accessed or exchanged,
and that does not rely on a fixed infrastructure that may not
























Figure 1. A Privacy Protecting Middleware
Our architecture is designed as a complement for exist-
ing service-oriented context-aware pervasive architectures.
It leverages existing components of such architectures and
introduces privacy-related modules that interact to provide
multi-level protection of personal data. Figure 1 shows
the architecture design. The legacy middleware layer con-
tains modules that already exist on traditional context-aware
pervasive architectures. The service-oriented infrastructure
layer contains modules to publish, discover, compose and
access services. Our middleware sits in between those two
layers, mediating requests for contextual data and commu-
nication. It enforces access control whenever data is ac-
cessed and transmitted, and adapts contextual information
to protect the user’s personal data.
Before any request for contextual data, the Context Ne-
gotiation module defines its characteristics so that only in-
formation strictly required for the transaction is disclosed.
After that, whenever context data is requested, the Context-
Data Resolution Control module modifies it to comply with
the requirements previously negotiated. A Data Access
Control module verifies if access to data is allowed tak-
ing into account contextual information such as location or
presence of other users.
All network communication must be allowed by the
Communication Access Control component. While the
Data Access Control module performs decisions based on
the content of requests, its communication counterpart deals
mostly with network-related issues. Before finally reaching
the network, messages can be anonymized by the Anony-
mous Communication component. The communication
anonymity level can be adapted according to the message
content: data that is highly sensitive may require stronger
anonymization than public data, for instance.
4 Conclusion
This work is a first step on integrating privacy protec-
tion technologies on a service-oriented architecture for per-
vasive computing. Right now we are working on detail-
ing the components of the architecture, their functions and
interactions. Privacy architectures are crucial for the defini-
tion of a software design where technologies do not overlap,
do not have conflicting requirements and cooperate to pro-
vide multi-level privacy protection and effectively protect
the user’s personal data.
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